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(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982);
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., THINKING, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. See id. for a recent review of heuristics and biases.
Afamous tale talks about three baseball umpires whowere asked how they rule on a ball. One said, “I call itlike I see it.” Another said, “I call it like it is.” And the
last one (and this is attributed to umpire Bill Klem) said, “It
ain’t nothin’ till I call it.” While the first umpire admitted he
was an imperfect human observer, the second and third
umpires claimed they were infallible and judged cases only
based on their objective merits. So, what can be said about
court judges? Are court judges such impartial rulers that they
can “call it like it is”? Or, as the first umpire humbly confessed,
are they limited human observers confined by the boundaries
of human cognition? 
In this article, we briefly review some of the accumulating
evidence suggesting that in some cases judges could be prone
to cognitive fallacies and biases that might affect their judicial
decisions. We review several studies on cognitive biases relat-
ing to elements of the hearing process (considering evidence
and information), ruling, or sentencing. These findings sug-
gest that irrelevant factors that should not affect judgment
might cause systemic and predictable biases in judges’ deci-
sion-making processes in a way that could be explained using
known cognitive heuristics and biases. 
Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts, or rules of thumb, by
which people generate judgments and make decisions without
having to consider all the relevant information, relying instead
on a limited set of cues that aid their decision making.1 Such
heuristics arise due to the fact that we have limited cognitive
and motivational recourses and that we need to use them effi-
ciently to reach everyday decisions. Although such heuristics
are generally adaptive and contribute to our daily life, the
reliance on a limited part of the relevant information some-
times results in systemic and predictable biases that lead to
sub-optimal decisions. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
(who later won an economics Nobel Prize for his joint work
with the late Tversky) introduced the heuristics-and-biases
approach by first identifying key heuristics and the biases they
sometimes cause. For example, the availability heuristic is the
one by which we judge the probability of an event based on
how easy it is to recall instances of such an event. Try to think,
for example, of words that start with the letter “r” compared to
words that have “r” as the third letter. Although the latter is
more frequent in English, people think there are more words
that start with “r” simply because they are easier to recall.2
The use of the availability heuristic, as with other cognitive
and judgmental heuristics, is one of the System 1 processes of
thinking.3 System 1 processes are those in which thinking, judg-
ment, and choice are more intuitive, experiential, and adaptive.
They are faster and consume fewer cognitive resources. This
contrasts the System 2 processes, which are more analytic, rely-
ing on facts and normative rules and requiring many more cog-
nitive resources—which are often not available in everyday situ-
ations.4 Although heuristics are highly adaptive and sometimes
offer “good-enough” solutions to a problem, they also lead to
judgmental biases, fallacies, and illusions that hamper people’s
judgments, choices, and decision making. 
Various heuristics and biases have been identified and
described in research literature.5 In this article, we review evi-
dence on the use of heuristics and biases among court judges
(as well as other professional law experts) that affect judgment
and the decision-making process in the courtroom. Before we
begin, we would like to note two related topics that are not
addressed in this article. The first concerns the vast literature
about social biases, such as racial bias or gender bias, that are
sometimes found in trials. Although this is a very important
issue, much has already been said (and done) about it, and it
is, as the reader will notice, very different from the cognitive
biases we describe here. Second, much research has focused on
biases among jurors’ decisions making. Although we some-
times mention jurors in the following pages, we decided to
generally exclude such research from the current review
because we would like to focus on how professional judges
(and sometimes lawyers) might be prone to cognitive biases,
despite their experience and expertise. In the next sections, we
review evidence for cognitive and judgmental biases that per-
tain to the hearing process, the ruling process, and the sen-
tencing process.  
BIASES IN THE HEARING PROCESS
During a trial, judges are presented with evidence; they may
ask for additional or other evidence, they may judge evidence as
inadmissible, or they may decide to give more (or less) weight
to certain pieces of evidence. Such tasks in the hearing process
might be affected by several cognitive biases including the con-
firmation bias, the hindsight bias, or the conjunction fallacy. 
Confirmation Bias
If people have a preconception or hypothesis about a given
issue, they tend to favor information that corresponds with
their prior beliefs and disregard evidence pointing to the con-
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trary. This confirmation bias makes people search, code, and
interpret information in a manner consistent with their
assumptions, leading them to biased judgments and deci-
sions.6 For example, in a classic study at Stanford University,
participants who were either for or against capital punishment
read about studies that either supported or challenged capital
punishment. It was shown that participants favored studies
that followed their prior attitudes: those who were in favor of
capital punishment agreed more with studies that confirmed
their position and rated those studies as better and more con-
vincing, while those who were against capital punishment
favored the studies that argued against it.7
Confirmation bias can also affect judges when they hear and
evaluate evidence brought before them in court. Specifically,
judges might be biased in favor of evidence that confirms their
prior hypotheses and might disregard evidence that does not
correspond with their previous assumptions. Indeed, several
studies have pointed to the occurrence of this bias among
judges, lawyers, or police officers. For example, Rassin and his
colleagues presented these groups of experts with a murder
case in which the victim was a female psychiatrist and the
prime suspect was the wife of one of her patients.8 The wife
was accused of killing the psychiatrist, allegedly out of jeal-
ousy. Participants were asked to review 20 pieces of informa-
tion and to rate the degree these incriminated or exonerated
the prime suspect. However, half of the participants were also
told about the possibility of another suspect: a former male
patient of the psychiatrist who had been harassing her for a
long time. Surprisingly, all participants rated the pieces of evi-
dence similarly and all thought the prime suspect was guilty in
the same degree. Thus, it seems that the judges, lawyers, and
police officers failed to consider the alternative scenario. Evi-
dence was considered only if it helped them confirm their
prior belief of the prime suspect’s guilt and was disregarded if
it pointed to a different suspect. 
Hindsight Bias
When people evaluate events or outcomes after they have
occurred, they sometimes exhibit a hindsight bias when they
judge the event as being more predictable then it was before it
actually happened. This “we knew it all along” phenomenon
has been shown to occur in many areas such as history, medi-
cine, finance, and the law, among others.9 In the basic experi-
ment, participants are given a set of possible outcomes and are
told which one of them is true. Then they are asked to assess
the probability of each outcome.
Although different participants are
told that different outcomes are
true, all assign higher probabilities
to the outcome told to be true, no
matter what it is.10 In general, the
hindsight bias refers to the
inequality between foresight and
hindsight: although events are less
predictable before than after they
actually happened, people cannot ignore information about
whether an event has happened or not, and they assign it a
higher probability in the former case.
Hindsight bias has been shown to occur in the courtroom as
well, mainly in liability cases.11 In such cases, the task of the
judges or jurors is to assess how foreseeable an outcome was
and to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s behavior took this risk
into consideration. The problem is that judges evaluate the
outcome in hindsight, while the plaintiff only had the chance
to provide foresight about it. For example, in one case a physi-
cian was accused of malpractice because he failed to detect a
tiny tumor in an early chest radiography. The tumor got bigger
and the patient died as a result, leading to the malpractice
claim. The physician was found guilty after another radiolo-
gist—who saw the radiographs after the tumor was found—
testified that the tumor could have been detected in the early
radiography.12 Clearly, the second radiologist had the benefit of
knowing the tumor was actually there, an advantage the first
physician did not have at the time. In addition, studies have
found that the severity of the outcome increases hindsight bias
dramatically. For example, judges who were informed that a
psychiatric patient became violent were more likely to find the
patient’s therapist negligent than those who did not receive
information about the outcome and its severity.13
Conjunction Fallacy
Another type of judgmental bias relates to how people judge
the probability of events based on the detail in which these
events are described. In particular, it has been found that more
detailed descriptions of an event can give rise to higher judged
probabilities.14 This bias has been termed the conjunction fal-
lacy because it shows that people erroneously believe that
events described in more detail are more probable than those
that are described in less detail. According to classic probabil-
ity theory, less detailed events actually contain various
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(1993).
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2098 (1979).
8. Eric Rassin, Anieta Eerland, & Ilse Kuijpers, Let’s Find the Evi-
dence: An Analogue Study of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investi-
gations, 7 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 231
(2010).
9. Baruch Fischhoff, An Early History of Hindsight Research, 25 SOC.
COGNITION 10 (2007).
10. Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, I Knew It Would Happen: Remem-
bered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1 (1975).
11. See Erin M. Harley, Hindsight Bias in Legal Decision Making, 25
SOC. COGNITION 48 (2007), for a review of hindsight bias in the
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(2000).
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the Hindsight Bias, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 501 (1996).
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instances of more detailed events
and thus cannot be less probable
than any of the contained events.
For example, just as the probabil-
ity of an object being a fruit can-
not be smaller than the probabil-
ity it is an apple, the probability
of a suspect being convicted of a
crime cannot be smaller than the
probability that he will be con-
victed of a specific crime, such as
burglary.
However, one study showed
that expert attorneys actually
committed this conjunction fal-
lacy when asked to evaluate the chances of a specific case
(Jones vs. Clinton) being disposed by a judicial verdict as
opposed to an outcome other than a judicial verdict.15 When
attorneys were asked to evaluate the probabilities of different
types of outcomes that were not judicial verdicts (such as set-
tlements, dismissals, withdrawals, etc.), they assigned much
higher probabilities to each of these outcomes—sometimes
totaling even higher than 1— than they did to the general
probability of the case being disposed by an outcome that was
“not a judicial verdict.”16 Although no studies have examined
this conjunction fallacy among judges, research on other biases
among judges (such as the research reviewed in this article)
leads us to predict that judges might be prone to this bias as
well. 
BIASES IN THE RULING PROCESS
The biases described in the previous section related to the
hearing process, but they also involved effects on the outcome
of a trial and the judge’s ruling process. In the next section we
review more examples of different biases that affect judges’ rul-
ing processes. These include the inability to ignore inadmissi-
ble evidence and biases in decisions of sequential ruling. 
Inability to Ignore Inadmissible Evidence
Sometimes evidence that is presented in trial can be deemed
as inadmissible because it was obtained illegally, is considered
hearsay, is highly prejudicial, or is problematic for some other
reason. When inadmissible evidence is wrongfully presented in
jury trials, judges may instruct juries to disregard or ignore the
evidence. However, many studies have shown that a jury’s abil-
ity to not consider inadmissible evidence is questionable at
best. For example, Doob and Kirshenbaum showed that mock
jurors were more likely to rate a defendant as guilty when they
were exposed to prior criminal-record information than when
no record information was given, even when judicial instruc-
tions were that prior record information should be used only
to determine credibility rather than as an indicator of guilt.17
Other studies showed similar findings, as jurors’ decisions
seemed unaffected by instructions to disregard or ignore inad-
missible evidence.18
That jurors—who are inexperienced laymen—cannot
ignore inadmissible evidence is not as surprising as is the fact
that some judges could not do so either. As one study showed,
experienced judges were not different from inexperienced
jurors in reacting to inadmissible evidence.19 In this study,
both groups read about a product-liability case including (or
not including) biasing material and were either instructed (or
not) to disregard this piece of inadmissible evidence. Both
jurors’ and judges’ verdicts depended heavily on whether the
biasing material was included, but these decisions were not
altered if that evidence was deemed as inadmissible. Thus, it
seems that judges, as with jurors, cannot easily disregard inad-
missible evidence, although they know they should.
Biased Decisions in Sequential Ruling
When judges make repeated sequential rulings, they tend to
rule more in favor of the status quo over time, but they can
overcome this tendency by taking a food break.20 In their
study, Danziger and his colleagues examined 1,112 judicial
rulings by 8 Israeli judges, made over 50 days in a 10-month
period, all regarding parole requests.21 The study showed that
about 65% of the rulings were in favor of the plaintiff at the
beginning of each session (in the morning, after breakfast
break, and after lunch break), and they gradually decreased to
0-10% at the end of each session. The authors concluded that
the repeated rulings depleted the judges’ mental resources,
causing judges to have a higher likelihood of granting parole in
the first cases after a break.22 However, additional analyses
showed that some overlooked factors—such as the non-ran-
dom ordering of cases (cases with representation sometimes go
first), and the fact that the parole board tries to complete cases
from one prison before taking a meal break—could have
accounted for some of the observed downward trend.23
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BIASES IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS
The next and final group of biases we review here relate to the
process of sentencing, or assigning punishment to the convicted
party. First, we review a comprehensive study that modeled sen-
tencing decision making by comparing normative to heuristic
models. Second, we discuss a prevalent bias in sentencing that
stems from the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. 
Modeling Sentencing Decisions
In the beginning of the article, we asked whether judges are
rational decision makers who contemplate every relevant aspect
in the optimal manner or whether they are sometimes satisfied
with using simpler heuristics. One study that tried to answer
this question regarding sentencing decisions examined several
possible normative and heuristic cognitive models in trying to
evaluate which model better described judicial decisions and
the magnitude of sentences in trials on theft, forgery, and fraud
in a German court.24 The results showed that with respect to
relatively minor offenses, prosecutors and judges considered
only a limited number of factors while neglecting other legally
relevant and highly important ones. The discrepancies between
the number of factors that should have been considered and the
number of those actually considered, according to the decision
analysis, were higher when the offense characteristics were less
serious; for more serious offenses, the discrepancies found were
smaller. Examining both judges and prosecutors in the context
of sentencing is important due to the high frequency of plea
bargaining, at least in U.S. courts.25 For example, although
judges and prosecutors indicate that they base their sentencing
and sentencing requests on the relevant and important factors
of the presence of a confession or a prior record, the analysis
revealed that these factors were neglected. Other relevant and
legally important factors indeed affected the sentencing, while
possible factors that should not affect sentencing (e.g., race, sex,
nationality) were found not to have affected it. Von Helversen
and Rieskamp indicated that the neglected factors could be
explained by cognitive constraints but also by time limitations
under which sentencing decisions were made.26
Anchoring-and-Adjustment
Anchoring-and-adjustment refers to the process of assimila-
tion of a numeric estimate toward a previously considered
standard. In their classic anchoring study, Tversky and Kahne-
man asked participants comparative and absolute consecutive
questions about the percentage of African nations in the
United Nations.27 In the com-
parative question, participants
indicated whether the percent-
age of African nations in the
U.N. was higher or lower than
an arbitrary number (the
anchor): either 65 or 10 (the
alleged result of spinning a
roulette wheel). Then, participants were asked an absolute
question regarding their best estimate of the actual percentage.
Absolute judgments were assimilated to the provided anchor
value, so the mean estimate of African nations in the U.N.
among participants who received the high anchor was 45%,
compared to 25% for participants receiving the low anchor.
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s classic study, the effect of
anchoring-and-adjustment has been demonstrated in various
domains of judgment and decision making and was proven to be
a strong, robust, reliable, and persistent psychological effect.28
Several theoretical explanations have been offered for the mech-
anism through which the anchor affects the numerical estima-
tion or prediction. Some scholars believe that people integrate
the anchor to the answer and adjust from it insufficiently,29
adjusting estimates until an acceptable value is found; however,
the adjustment is usually insufficient because it arrives at the
nearest upper or lower boundary of a large range of acceptable
values.30 There is also the selective-accessibility model, in which
comparing a target to an anchor leads to a biased search strategy
consistent with positive-hypothesis testing: when presented
with a low anchor, people will retrieve information consistent
with the hypothesis that the estimate is small, and vice versa.31
As can be expected, judges have also been found to be
affected by anchors in their judicial decisions. As criminal-sen-
tencing decisions pertain to numeric quantities, they are also
affected by numeric anchors, whether they are minimal sen-
tences that the law presents or sentences demanded or recom-
mended by prosecutors,32 attorneys, or probation officers.33 For
example, anchoring affected both novice and experienced
judges when they were presented with two different demands
for sentence by an alleged prosecutor on a hypothetical rape
case—12 months or 34 months.34 Anchoring affected the ruling
sentence even when the judges declared that the anchor was
not relevant to their decision. Enough and Mussweiler sug-
gested that the anchor affected the ruling of the judges because
of selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent
knowledge: given an anchor of a relatively severe punishment
Court Review - Volume 49 117
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(34 months in the above study), the judges retrieved more
information that was consistent with this sentence—that is, evi-
dence and details that were consistent with more severe pun-
ishment.35 In contrast, given the more lenient punishment (12
months in the study), the judges retrieved more information
that was consistent with this sentence—that is, evidence and
details that were consistent with less severe punishment. As a
result, the rulings of the judges were affected by the given
anchor, whether it was more relevant and informative or less so. 
In a follow-up study, Englich and others showed a similar
anchoring effect even when the anchor was set not by the pros-
ecutor (a potentially relevant source), but rather by a journal-
ist (who is an irrelevant source, as the media should not affect
judicial decisions).36 The study compared the effect of anchor-
ing on judges who were experts in criminal law versus others
who were not, to find similar effects for the two groups.37
These findings are consistent with those of Northcraft and
Neale, as well as Mussweiler and others, who found that the
judgments of experts are also susceptible to the effect of
anchoring.38
CONCLUSION
In this article, we summarized research that demonstrated
how heuristic thinking is involved in judicial decision making.
Although heuristic thinking is typically efficient, it may cause
biases at times.39 Heuristic thinking was demonstrated in vari-
ous contexts of the hearing process, the ruling process, and the
sentencing process. The hearing process may be affected by
hindsight bias, confirmation bias, or the conjunction fallacy.
Heuristic thinking also characterizes some of the ruling
process that might be biased, since judges are unable to ignore
inadmissible evidence and since they make biased decisions in
sequential rulings. Heuristic thinking might also affect the sen-
tencing process, due to a tendency to rely on a limited number
of factors and because of the dominant effect of anchoring.
Thus, research suggests that judges, prosecutors, and other
professionals in the legal field use heuristic thinking in judicial
processes and decisions, although not all of them may be aware
of such use. 
A question that arises is, “What can be done to counteract
judicial bias?” To answer this question, one must first deter-
mine the origin of the bias. The method of overcoming bias
depends on whether the cause of bias lies in the task, the
judge, or a combination of the two. If we assume a judge is the
culprit, we may employ techniques that aim at improving the
judge’s ability to circumvent the bias. Fischhoff identified sev-
eral such techniques, including warning people in advance
about the existence of bias, describing the likely direction of a
bias, illustrating biases to the judges, and providing extended
training, feedback, coaching, and other interventions.40 He
concluded that the first three strategies yielded limited success
and that even intensive, personalized feedback and training
produced only moderate improvements in decision making.41
Although some experiments have shown that some biases,
such as the hindsight bias, could be counteracted, research is
still needed to explore whether it is possible to counteract
other biases among judges, such as the ones described in this
article, and to what degree.42 Obviously, awareness to the
heuristic thinking and the resulting possible biases affecting
judicial decisions is a prerequisite for any future attempt to
limit these biases. We hope that this article will be a small step
towards that goal. 
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